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I.

INTRODUCTION

Is anything ever actually original? As Judge Learned Hand
identified in Nichols, works build off of common tropes and
archetypes.1 It is the artist’s expression of those ideas, which
copyright protects. Take the case of Nichols, for example, where the
court was faced with two stories, detailing the plight of two starcrossed lovers, juxtaposed by their different religious and ethnic
roots, set in modern New York.2 Now ask yourself, does it seem
logical to allow one author monopoly over this story, and not the
other? Or, are there certain ideas, even if they are strung together in
the same way, which must be left within the public domain for
multiple authors to express how they please? The court decided the
latter. This makes sense in light of the Copyright and Patent Clause
of the Constitution, which specifically enumerates that the purpose
of the congressionally granted monopoly is “To promote the
progress of science and useful arts.”3 It would not promote progress
to foreclose common themes and ideas to all others who may
endeavor to express them. Then, what if the expression itself is in
question? For example, if the ideas are presented in a more
functional, rather than artistic, manner. That is what the Supreme
Court was faced with in the case of Google v. Oracle, where certain
lines of code that, to some extent, served both a functional purpose
and represented the creativity of its authors, was faced with two
questions: One, whether the code is copyrightable at all, or an
uncopyrightable, idea, process, or function; and two, if the code is
*Claire Price is a second year law student at DePaul University College of Law
and writing and research staff member of the DePaul Journal of Art,
Technology, and Intellectual Property Law. Her focus is in technology and
intellectual property law. She is from Bolingbrook, Illinois. She graduated from
Loyola University Chicago.
1
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930).
2
Id. at 120.
3
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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protected under copyright, whether Google’s use of said code
qualified as a fair use, shielding it from liability from infringement.
Google v. Oracle demonstrates the heart of the issue of the
law attempting to reconcile its legal precedent with continually
arising new technological issues: The application of copyright and
patent law to modern technological problems appears to be
inadequate in several aspects.4 For one, Google v. Oracle arose ten
years ago. The decision from the Supreme Court originates from a
lengthy and scattered procedural history that reflects the judicial
inefficiencies of attempting to apply copyright and patent law to
current issues. Furthermore, the product at issue, the java
programming platform, is virtually irrelevant now compared to new
programming languages that have developed since, all of which
relied on the previously unestablished principle of use of such code
qualifying as fair use. This raises the question of if the historical
principles and rules of copyright and patent law should be
applicable at all to the emergence of new technology and its
business practices, or whether new alternatives should be devised.
The Court in Google v. Oracle struggled to apply copyright
doctrine to the code at issue, and ultimately chose not to address the
issue of whether the code is copyrightable at all.5 The majority
assumed copyrightability and moved to fair use, which Justice
Thomas was quick to adjudge as a mistake that distorted the core of
the majority’s analysis in his dissent.6 The majority concluded that
Google’s use was fair use, while the dissent disagreed.7 Both sides
used the exact same factors in order to analyze whether the use of
the code in question was fair use, yet each came to completely
different conclusions.8
Attempting to apply legal rules which were formulated on
vastly different types of works in comparison to the new works
4

Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., No. 18-956, slip op. (U.S. April 5, 2021).
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
5
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presented by technology today, is becoming an issue ever-more
present in the legal world. A related example also within the
bounds of both patent and copyright law, is the issue of Artificial
Intelligence. AI continues to create more problems for the courts
than can be solved. For example, a Circuit Judge in Virginia
recently held that AI is not an inventor under patent law.9 New
technology like AI presents even further paradoxical issues that
will continue to press on the judicial system as the technology
continues to evolve. Questions that will inevitably be before the
court. Questions such as: Can or should AI be an author or
inventor within the meaning of copyright or patent law? Some
would argue yes. Facebook’s previous head AI researcher would
seem to be a proponent of extending authorship to AI, “Our
intelligence is what makes us human, and AI is an extension of
that quality.” Yet this could also be seen to mean that the human is
the author of the AI and the AI is merely an extension of it. Again,
this demonstrates just a small facet of the issue. For each problem
that appears, twenty new questions arise. For each new problem
that arises in the legal world due to rapid technological
advancement, twenty new ones seem to appear.
Therefore, it is important to understand and analyze the
policy decisions, and in Part II of this note we will discuss the
legal history, and the rules behind copyright and patent law as a
basis for understanding the opinion. Part III will analyze the
decision in depth in terms of both legal and policy concerns in the
application of these antiquated principles to modern problems
which will pivot into the analyzation and discussion of the stark
differences between the majority and the dissent’s outcome in
terms of their respective applications of the categories of fair use.
Finally, in Part IV we will dive into suggested alternatives and
how the legal profession and legislature can adapt in order to
properly address these issues with the efficiency and accuracy that
is necessary for the further development of tech law in order to

9

Susan Decker, Only Humans, Not AI Machines, Get a U.S. Patent, Judge Says,
Bloomberg (Sept. 3, 2021) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0903/only-humans-not-ai-machines-can-get-a-u-s-patent-judge-rules.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2022

3

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 4
PRICE: GOOGLE V. ORACLE: HOW IT HIGHLIGHTS THE INADEQUACIES OF SHOEHORNING NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

96

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

[Vol. XXXII:

promote the protection and predictability of such protection for the
benefit of authors and inventors.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Hurdles of Copyright Law
At first glance, Copyright law can seem simple, however,
there are a few limitations that have proven to be significant hurdles
for the application of Copyright law to new technology. For
example, one issue presented in Google v. Oracle was whether the
code in question qualified as copyrightable subject matter.
Copyright does not extend to, “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”10
Ideas and facts are not copyrightable subject matter. Facts
can be subject to a very narrow exception. That is, when the author
or creator arranged and selected the facts in a particular way that
demonstrates a level of artistic expression. This can also be an issue
in technology cases involving copyright law and is itself related to
Merger.
Merger refers to when an idea merges with its expression
and is only capable of expression in one, or limited number of ways.
If an idea falls within the Merger doctrine, then it is not
copyrightable. Analysis of the code at issue in this case presented a
merger problem which called into question the code’s
copyrightability.11
The four factors for Fair Use, articulated by the Court in
Google v. Oracle and as codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act, are
as follows: (1) The character of the defendant’s use; (2) The nature
of the plaintiff’s work; (3) The amount and substantiality of the
portion used; (4) The subsequent market effects.12 The character of
10

17. U.S.C. § 102(b).
Google No. 18-956, slip op. at 1213.
12
17 U.S.C. § 107.
11
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the defendant’s use focuses on whether the work was transformative
of the work from which it copies, or commercial.13 If it is
transformative, then it favors the finding of fair use. The nature of
the work turns on whether the work is functional, or a creative
expression. Functionality will also weigh the scales toward fair use,
while creative expression will lead to the opposite conclusion. The
amount of the portion used may seem intuitive, however, it can be
deceiving. While the smaller the portion copied may point towards
fair use, this factor can change based on whether that section goes
to the heart of the original work at issue. Finally, the subsequent
market effects turn on whether the copied product serves as a market
substitute, thus affecting the original author’s ability to benefit
commercially from the work. This would go against a finding of fair
use.
The ultimate policy goals and rules from which copyright
law finds its origins, stems from the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power, “To
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”14 Therefore, any analysis
involving copyright law will also have to ask the necessary
question: will this decision effectuate an outcome that aligns with
the ultimate goal of the copyright clause of the constitution, “To
promote the progress of science and useful arts?”15
B. Google v. Oracle
In the case of Google v. Oracle, the decisions and analysis,
in some ways, rested on how the lawyers and the judges chose to
define the code at issue. Google copied lines of code from Oracle’s
API (application programming interface).16 An API is a software
interface which allows a user to perform certain tasks. Imagine the
API as an organized collection system of a library. Now imagine
13

Google No. 18-956 at 1218.
Article I, § 8, cl. 8.
15
Id.
16
Google No. 18-956 at 1186.
14
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that each individual book in that library is a task (a “method” in the
programming world), that is stored with like-tasks which form a
“class” like a common genre of books. Imagine then, that these
common genres of books are all stored in rooms of other similar
genres or “classes.” These are called “packages.” The order of the
organization of the library is therefore: package, class, and task.
This organizational structure is referred to as an “SSO” (structure,
sequence, and organization).17
For each task, there is an implementing code that tells the
computer how to do that task. These are pre-written lines of code
which can be hundreds of lines long, so programmers enter a
command which matches the implementing code. This is known as
the “declaring code.” The declaring code is another part of the API.
In other words, think of the implementing code as the words within
the book itself, instructing you, the computer, on how to do a task.
The declaring code is the shortcut that the programmer, the avid
reader at the library, uses in order to find that task, or the book itself.
The code at issue is the declaring code.18
As we can see from the structure of the API, the issue of the
copyrightability of the declaring code presents several issues. The
code could arguably be a “procedure, process, system, method of
operation” and thus not copyrightable.19 The code is also seemingly
tied to the implementing code and API, which presents a merger
problem. Furthermore, the declaring code could also be seen as
something that is functional and not a creative expression by an
author. Do you blame the majority for skipping the issue of
copyrightability entirely? It is difficult enough to attempt to
understand the underlying process of the API.
Ten years ago, Google acquired Android. In an attempt to
market Android phones to more users, Google decided to create a
platform in order to code in java (the popular coding language at the
17

Id. at 1191.
Id. At 1192.
19
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
18
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time) in order to incentivize coders to create applications for mobile
use on the Android devices. To accomplish this task, Google coded
its own platform, however, it copied a portion of Oracle’s API. The
rationale for copying this portion of the API was that it was essential
to launch Google’s new platform so that programmers could
successfully code in java. To many, this was deemed to be a fair use
of the material, that is, if the code in question was itself
copyrightable. To just as many, it was not a fair use, but an
infringement.
The Court continued with its history of deciding on the
narrowest grounds possible by ignoring the question of
copyrightability entirely. Instead, the majority focused on whether,
assuming that the code is copyrightable, Google’s use of the code
fell within the Fair Use exception to infringement.20 The Court ruled
that it did. As we will discuss later, the majority and dissent come
to completely different conclusions based on the analysis of the
same four factors. When reading both of these opinions, they are
each convincing, which further demonstrates why this case was so
divisive among the tech and law communities alike, and the overall
issues with the use of copyright and patent doctrine to modern
technological issues.
C. The Future of Copyright Law: Plausible
Alternative Solutions?
Compulsive licensing is one proposed solution to issues in
both patent and copyright law.21Under a compulsive licensing
scheme, “[A] government allows someone else to produce a
patented product or process without the consent of the patent owner
or plans to use the patent-protected invention itself.”22
20

Google No. 18-956 at 1200.
Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid
Technological Change, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 307, 339 (1989).
22
World Trade Organization, Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and
TRIPS (2021),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm
21
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This scheme is not new and is part of the World Trade
Organization’s agreement on intellectual property and TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement
which took effect in January of 1995. Under this regime, the patent
or copyright owner is compensated for the use of their work while
those who desire to use it are allowed to do so.
However, this scheme comes with its own problems. For
one, it has been a struggle to incentivize companies to innovate via
de facto compulsive licensing. Companies such as Apple are
reluctant to allow others to use their software and the decision in
Google v. Oracle now looms over other patent and copyright
litigation. In the past, companies such as Apple have been
concerned with their rights and abilities to have control over their
work under a compulsory licensing scheme, and ensuring return on
investment when prices are not set. Under the TRIPS Agreement
“the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value
of the authorization”, but it does not define “adequate
remuneration” or “economic value”.23
There is also the FRAND license.24 The goal of the FRAND
license is to give the licensee reasonable terms, as opposed to a
patent holder charging high royalty rates for use. A necessary
compromise in a world where many technology companies hoard
patents or are unwilling to relinquish their technology to possible
competitors. A FRAND license is essentially a voluntary agreement
between an industry group that sets “common standards in
significant areas of invention to facilitate mediation between
intellectual property owners and users.”25 The goal is to maximize
efficiency in the industry both on the product side, by setting a
common design for the devices in question that implements all the
necessary technology, and on the legal side by providing patents to
23

Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS (2021).
“FRAND” stands for fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. Srividhya
Ragavan et al., Frand v. Compulsory Licensing: The Lesser of the Two Evils, 14
Duke Law & Technology Review 83, 84 (2015).
25
Id. at 87.
24

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol32/iss1/4
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those who need them without being extorted for unnecessary fees
for advancements that the industry becomes increasingly reliant
upon. This both encourages the patent owners to have their patented
technology to be the standard while allowing for others to use these
patents.26 In return, the patent holders also receive royalties.
Other private agencies have been proposed in order to set
compensation schemes for copyrighted and patented works.27 This
would be a medium between the compulsory scheme and one in
which every desired user needs to seek out permission from the
owner. Under this idea, referred to as a voluntary licensing scheme,
owners may negotiate their own royalty scheme.28 However, there
is the question of whether this would actually solve the problem or
create more. If the owner has to negotiate the royalty scheme with
the agency or every user, this could create more burdens than
benefits in concern to overall efficiency.
As we will see and further discuss, there are many more
bureaucratic solutions such as a scheme involving independent
agencies as above, or ones in which an owner would negotiate with
the government to sell his rights for compensation.29 Schemes such
as these are referred to as “rewards for authors” schemes in which
the monetary reward for authors is entirely separated from the
property rights.30 However, it may be argued that part of the reward
and incentive is allowing the author and owner, and their subsequent
estates or successors, to exercise control of the property rights.
Overall, it is clear that there is no clear solution, but further
incentives need to be put into place in order to strike the proper
balance between providing the public with works that are freely
available to be used in order to “promote the progress of science and
useful arts” per the intention of the constitution, and to incentivize
26

Id. at 88.
Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid
Technological Change, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 307, 336 (1989).
28
Id.
29
Lior Zeimer, Rethinking Copyright Alternatives, 14 INT'l J.L. & INFO.
TECH. 137 (2006).
30
Id.
27
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current and new authors and creators to continue to create for the
benefit of society as a whole.
III.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal History & Rules Underlying Copyright Law
Copyright is founded on the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the Constitution which states that Congress shall have the power
“To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”31 To qualify for copyright,
there are three distinct elements an author must satisfy. The work
must be created, original, and fixed in a tangible medium of
expression.32 But what exactly is an “original” work of authorship?
Original, as defined by the Supreme Court, means that the work was
a result of independent creation of the author, as opposed to copied
from another’s work, which has at least a modicum of creativity.33
What exactly is a modicum of creativity?34 This question
was addressed in Burrow Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony which
presented the question of whether photographs were protected under
copyright law.35 Giles argued that a photograph was not a writing
produced by an author and therefore was not an original work of

31

U.S. Cons., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
33
“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works),
and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” 1 M. Nimmer
& D. Nimmer, Copyright §§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990) . Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991).
34
“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as
they possess some creative spark, “no matter how crude, humble or obvious” it
might be. Id., § 1.08 [C] [1]. Originality does not signify novelty; a work may
be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the
similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.” Id. at 1287.
35
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,56 (1884).
32

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol32/iss1/4
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authorship, but a copy of what already exists in real life.36 The Court
disagreed. It found that a photograph is an original idea due to the
choices made by the photographer like the light, clothes,
background, and other materials used in the creation of the
photograph which evoke a feeling.37 Burrow Giles is a hallmark
case in Copyright law because it identifies the limits of copyright
law, such as whether the work claiming protection was within the
class of inventions which the constitution intended for Congress to
protect with exclusive rights. The case also hints at the issue for
which Copyright law is struggling to grapple with today: when is a
combination of uncopyrightable materials copyrightable.
Copyright places express limits on copyrightable subject
matter, “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extent to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the from
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.”38 The copyright cases involving code and programming
often turn on the language of § 102(b).39 Users of lines of code who
have been accused of infringement often argue that the code in
question is an uncopyrightable idea, procedure, process, system, or
method of operation. There are notable exceptions to
copyrightability not extending to facts. Expression of ideas and facts
are copyrightable. Furthermore, compilations of facts if the
selection, coordination, and arrangement of said facts are done in
such a way to reflect expression, then it can fall on the side of thin
copyright.40 One of the key historical cases concerning this
distinction is Baker v. Selden. 41
Selden made a condensed ledger system that improved
book-keeping in such a way that a month’s worth of data could be
catalogued on a single page. Baker used a similar layout for the
36

Id.
Id. at 61.
38
§ 102(b).
39
Id.
40
Feist, 499 U.S. at 341.
41
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L. Ed. 841 (1879).
37
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same results but his overall arrangement was different from
Selden’s. Ultimately, this case turned on two fundamental doctrines:
Blank Form Doctrine and Merger Doctrine. Blank form doctrine
essentially says that one cannot copyright a blank form, or a method
of conveying information. This stems from the overall purpose of
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, “To promote the progress
of science and the useful arts.”42 A method, process, fact (discovery)
belongs to everyone for the benefit of society as a whole. Merger
doctrine refers to where the idea merges with its expression.43
Where there is only one, or very limited ways, of expressing an idea,
then it cannot be protected by Copyright.44 The doctrine is often
implicated in cases involving code and in Google v. Oracle in
reference to declaring code.
Overall, copyright protection is a delicate balancing act of
the exclusive rights of authors weighed against the benefits that the
author’s works can bring to society. Congress wants to give authors
exclusive rights in order to incentivize creation of new works. Why?
Because it ties back to the underlying purpose of copyright as
enumerated in the copyright clause of the constitution. We want to
promote progress for the benefit of society as a whole. However, in
order to ensure that benefit, all works must be exclusive only for a
period of time thus eventually falling into the public domain for free
distribution and use by the people. Until that time, authors and
artists have rights that are exclusive to them that they may assign as
they wish so that those works can still be used, while the authors
earn the profit and other benefits that come from their hard work.
If the work at issue is found to be copyrightable, and the
plaintiff shows that the defendant had copied, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to show that an applicable defense to infringement
applies. The most common defense, and the one applicable in
42
“[E]]ven expression is not protected in those instances where there is only one
or so few ways of expressing an idea that protection of the expression would
effectively accord protection to the idea itself.” Kregos v. Associated Press, 937
F.2d 700, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
43
Id.
44
Id.at 706.
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Google, is Fair Use. The four main factors that courts must consider
are enumerated in § 107: (1) The purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work; (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market value of the
copyrighted work.45 When a court is analyzing fair use, these four
factors must be among the factors considered, however, congress
intentionally left room for other factors to be considered. The
preamble to § 107 also provides a non-exhaustive list of types of
uses which constitute fair use, which courts regularly analyze to
assess whether the use that is contemplated is within the scope of
the uses that congress intended to protect.46
Why provide a fair use defense? The answer is simpler than
it may appear at first glance. One of the primary examples in the list
of fair uses provided by congress is use for the purposes of teaching.
Education is a main thread in fair use as it also includes scholarship
and research. Such uses are clear examples of use that congress
would like to incentivize in order to promote progress. Furthermore,
if you were an author or a creator, if a teacher or scholar approached
and asked permission to use your work for such purposes would you
deny them? Most would say no. Another key policy consideration
in copyright law is efficiency. If such uses are of the kind that most
authors would approve of, it follows that those uses should be
permitted, and offered protection under fair use. Fair use is designed
to provide the proper balance in order to discern between those uses
that are deemed to be legitimate uses of a copyrighted work and
weed out those uses which are an infringement of an author’s
exclusive rights.

45

17 U.S.C. § 107.
“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”
Id.
46
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In light of this, the issues, especially in concern to policy, in
Google v. Oracle are clearer. Oracle invested the time and money
in creating a programming language and platform for users which it
would license and receive fees from amounting to substantial
profits. Google wanted to implement this platform into its new
mobile device venture. Oracle is rightfully concerned of the possible
outcomes of Google copying portions of its code.
B. The Decision In Depth
i.

The Majority Opinion
a. Copyrightability of Computer Programs

The issue of the copyrightability of the code at issue is one
which emphasizes the tension between two statutory provisions of
the Copyright Act. Congress expanded the reach of the Copyright
Act to include computer programs in 1980. It added the definition
of computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result.” Under this definition, Oracle argues that computer
code is a literary work that was intended to be protected under the
Act. However, copyright explicitly prohibits protection from “any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery.” The Court does not attempt to reconcile
these two provisions in order to come to a decision on the
copyrightability of the declaring code at issue, but it ultimately does
determine that code is copyrightable. “By defining computer
programs in § 101, Congress chose to place this subject matter
within the copyright regime. Like other protected works, that means
that the owners of computer programs enjoy exclusive rights set
forth in the Act . . . But that also means that exclusive rights in
computer programs are limited like any other works.”47
Herein lies the first problem. Although Congress attempted
to rectify any question of copyrightability of programming, many
47

Google No. 18-956, slip op. at 1199.
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questions were left unanswered. The lack of clarity may have been
done with intention. Congress prefers to leave room for
interpretation in matters that are still undergoing development, or in
areas of law where the decisions may depend heavily on the facts of
the case. One such example is fair use. Fair use only mandates that
the courts analyze those four factors enumerated in the statute,
however, it is explicit that the court may continue to develop the
doctrine of fair use and consider additional factors. Another
possibility is far simpler: Congress simply did not know enough
about computer programming in order to establish a bright line rule
concerning its copyrightability. The same can also be said for the
majority’s decision to sidestep the question of copyrightability. The
language of the opinion clearly acknowledges that code is
copyrightable, however, it is hesitant whether for lack of
understanding or with the intention to leave leeway for future
decisions, to create a precedent that may restrict technological
progress.
b. Nature of The Plaintiff’s Work
Instead, the majority opinion sidesteps the question of
copyrightability altogether. Thus, the question analyzed is assuming
that the code at issue is copyrightable, whether or not Google’s use
of said code constitutes a fair use. The specific packages copied
were essential for the use of the Java language, otherwise, Google
coded its own platform. Of fair use Justice Breyer says, “the concept
is flexible, that courts must apply it in light of the sometimes
conflicting aims of copyright law, and that its application may well
vary depending upon context.”48 The analysis begins, oddly enough,
with the second factor of fair use: the nature of the Plaintiff’s work.
The Court ultimately decides that this factor favors fair use. First,
the declaring code is an idea, which is not copyrightable subject
matter capable of protection under the Act. The declaring code is
essentially a method of organizing tasks for a programmer to call
upon (the commands). In other words, although the code enables the
coder to use the platform and effectuate a certain result, it does not
itself create that result, but it is a mechanism in the cog of the
48

Id. at 1197.
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machine that helps to produce that result. The declaring code, says
the Court, is “inextricably bound” with the system.49 Sound
familiar? According to the majority, the idea merges with its
expression. Thus, the declaring code is an idea which is not
copyrightable, but even if it were the expression of an idea (which
copyright protects) the idea merges with expression and is therefore
disqualified by merger.
However, Justice Breyer does recognize that the declaring
code is not completely devoid of creativity. The Court references
the witness testimony below which stated that writing implementing
programs involves a different kind of creativity. Programmers of
implementing code bound by the confines of physical limits of
computers. Processing power, battery life, and the time it takes to
execute tasks. All of which are necessary components. Despite this
creativity, however, the Court still concludes that, unlike other
programs, the use is bound with the “general task division and
organization.”50 The merger problem presented by the declaring
code, leads to the conclusion that the code at issue falls farther from
the core of copyright. Since the code lies on the thinner side of
copyright, reasons the Court, the fear that applying fair use to this
case would undermine the general copyright protections that
Congress afforded to computer programs is easily remedied.
Therefore, this factor favors fair use.
c. The Purpose and Character of The
Use
Secondly, the Court looks to the purpose and character of
the Petitioner’s use. The threshold question that the courts consider
under this factor is whether or not the use in question is
“transformative.” A work is transformative when the copying adds
“something new with a further purpose or different character.”51
The rule, in its totality, is whether the use can be “reasonably
49

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202.
51
Id. at 1202.
50
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perceived as embodying an entirely distinct artistic purpose, one
that conveys ‘new meaning or message’ entirely separate from its
source material.’”52 Again, this has its roots in the Copyright and
Patent Clause. Does the use offer something new which ultimately
promotes progress? The majority finds that it does. In coming to this
conclusion, the Court relies on the fact that Google copied the
declaring code in order to create a mobile platform for the Java
language which would enable coders who are already familiar with
the language to code and create programs on entirely new platforms
that were previously unavailable to them. This would not only
encourage programmers to develop new applications, but it would
also incentivize the public to buy Google’s newly acquired mobile
devices. Therefore, the work is transformative.
The other two common considerations under the first factor
of copyright are commerciality and bad faith. Commerciality refers
to whether the use is commercial in nature. In the past, uses that
were for-profit often led to the presumption against fair use.
However, in recent years, the courts have emphasized that there are
several cases of fair use that are commercial. In fact, several of the
examples of fair use listed in the preamble of § 107 are commercial.
It is therefore logical to assume that Congress did not intend to
swallow up its own examples by holding all commercial uses to
presumptively constitute infringement. This is not to say that
commerciality has been rendered a completely useless factor of
consideration. Absent a finding of a degree of transformation, the
weight that commerciality holds on the copyright scale tips further
against fair use. Bad faith is more intuitive and is also tied to the
question of whether the use is transformative. Bad faith may be
implicated here. Google and Oracle originally attempted to
negotiate a license. Unable to come to terms, this deal fell through,
and Google copied anyway. Does this infer bad faith on Google’s
part? The Court only expresses skepticism on the importance of bad
faith in the analysis of fair use at all and focuses instead on the other
factors.
52

Andy Warhol Found. for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 11 F.4th 26, 41 (2d
Cir. 2021).
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With both of these factors, the degree to which a use is
transformative also appears to be of importance to the courts. The
more transformative a use, the less important the overall
commerciality of the use.53 Since Google’s use of the declaring code
is considered by the Court to be transformative to a substantial
degree, the overall commercial nature of the venture is weighed less.
Thus, according to the Court, this factor, in light of the several
considerations as a whole, falls into neutrality.
d. The Amount and Substantiality of
The Portion Copied
The amount and substantiality of the portion used requires
the analysis of both quality and quantity. Quantity refers to the
amount copied compared to the Plaintiff’s whole work. Quality,
however, refers to the type of content copied. In many cases
involving literature, for example, the threshold examination is
whether the portions used by the defendant are “heart” of the
plaintiff’s work. 54
The Court phrases the question as “whether those 11,500
lines of code should be viewed in isolation or as one part of the
considerably greater whole.”55 Furthermore “the ‘substantiality’
factor will generally weigh in favor of fair use where, as here, the
amount of copying was tethered to a valid, and transformative,
purpose.”56 The Court thinks that this test is satisfied. For one, the
quantitative nature of the copying is minimal. It is a total of 0.4% of
the total Sun Java API program. The qualitative nature, Justice
Breyer says, is purely functional. Those 37 packages were copied
purely to enable the overall functionality of the program which was
necessary in order to fulfill the overall transformative purpose of the
new platform: to enable programmers who were already familiar
with the java programming language to program on Android
53

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 544
(1985).
55
Google No. 18-956, slip op. at 1205.
56
Id.
54
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devices which furthers the development of programs. Therefore,
substantiality weighs in favor of fair use.
e. Market Effects
The market effect refers to the effect that the copying in
question may have on the copyrighted work’s market or value.57
One factor is the possible loss of revenue the copyright owner may
face, balanced with the benefit to society that the copying may
produce. Potentiality for lost revenue, however, does not include
those lost sales which may flow from natural consequences like
comments or criticisms that reduce interest in, and sales of, the work
in question. Criticisms and comments are protected works under
copyright too, and these are the ideas that naturally flow from, and
are encouraged by, the Copyright and Patent Clause in order to
encourage the free-flow of new ideas into the marketplace.
The majority reasoned that the market effects were minimal
in this case due to the fact that Oracle was “poorly positioned to
succeed in the mobile phone market.”58 The evidence presented
showed that there was an attempt to break into the mobile phone
market which proved unsuccessful, and that such failure was not a
result of Google’s acquisition of Android.59 Again, the Court ties
this analysis back to the transformative nature of Google’s copying.
This use was justified in that it was more than a simple
“repurposing” of the code, but that the “platform was part of a
distinct (and more advanced) market than Java software.”60 Notice
also that the Court differentiates between Google’s market for
mobile devices, and Oracle’s market which was largely based on
computers. Although the Court does recognize that Google did
make a substantial amount of money from this venture, and that
Oracle may have even been entitled to the profits thereof, it posits
that the enforcement of said copyright in this scenario would limit

57

17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
Google No. 18-956, slip op. at 1206.
59
Id. at 1209.
60
Id. at 1207.
58
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future creativity and new programs.61 This is not necessarily
incorrect. At the time, and throughout the years that it took for this
case to work its way through the court system, such copying of APIs
had become a standard industry practice that many had come to rely
on. An industry practice that, one could say, allowed for the fastpaced development of technology which eventually rendered this
very coding language before the court, virtually nonexistent among
programmers.
f. Outcome
As a result, ten years later, the Court decided that Google’s
use of the 11,500 lines of the Sun Java API was a fair use.62 The
overall impact of this is currently up for speculation, however, the
Court has afforded both itself, and the industry, wide-latitude for
possible fair uses of similar programs or technology. However,
many companies may still be deterred from relying on fair use due
to the lengthy, and inconsistent history of this case, and will most
likely continue to proceed to seek licenses. There have also been
other licenses, such as FRAND licenses, which have enabled the
companies to compromise in the interest of reaching both fair
licensing agreements and allowing others to use their technological
advancements so that the whole of society benefits.
ii.

The Dissent

Justices Thomas and Alito come to a completely different
conclusion however, based on the analysis of the same factors.
Furthermore, Justice Thomas’s reasoning may be considered just as
persuasive. How?
b. Copyrightability
Justice Thomas argues that assuming the copyrightability of
declaring code is a mistake that “disregards half the relevant

61
62

Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1212.
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statutory text and distorts its fair use analysis.”63 According to the
dissent, the definition of computer code which Congress
enumerated in the Copyright Act is an express protection of
computer code.64 Even absent this provision, declaring code would
meet the requirements for copyrightability.65 The argument says
that (1) this is supported by the legislative interpretation of the
Copyright Act, and (2) the distinction between the declaring and
implementing code is unsupported by the language of the statute
and thus the overall intent of Congress on the protection that is
supposed to be afforded to computer programs.66 Therefore, the
code is copyrightable and Google’s copying is an infringement that
can only be protected if fair use can be shown.
c. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The first assessment is whether the work is creative or
functional.67 Justice Thomas says that the majority’s use of this
factor to distinguish between the implementing and declaring code
does not align with Congress’s intent because the definition of
computer program includes computer code that creates a certain
result both “directly (implementing code) and indirectly (declaring
code).”68 Furthermore, the dissent argues that declaring code is
actually further to the core of copyright than is implementing code,
in direct contradiction with the view taken by the majority because
the declaring code, in contrast to the implementing code which
“conveys no expression” is user facing and designed by
programmers in a way that reflects creative expression.69 This point
on the creative expression of the declaring code at issue is
something that the majority acknowledges. Lastly, on the point of
merger, the dissent argues that there is no work that is not bound

63

Google No. 18-956, slip op. at 1211.
Id.
65
Id. at 1185.
66
Id. at 1213.
67
Id. at 1215.
68
Google No. 18-956, slip op. at 1215.
69
Id.
64
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inherently in some way to uncopyrightable ideas. Is this a correct
assessment of the core of the majority’s argument?
It is not incorrect. This does reflect Learned Hand’s
abstraction test which, in effect, states that nothing is original
because all works contain uncopyrightable ideas, but it is the
author’s expression of those ideas which copyright protects.70 Thus,
copyright functions on more of a spectrum where at one end there
is the core of copyright law, and on the other, there is “thin”
copyright. The stark differences between the majority and dissent
on the exact same principles and rules emphasizes the difficulty in
the application of old legal standards to new technological
advancements that seem to straddle the lines of intellectual property
law and, in many cases, directly challenge it.
d.

Market Effects

The dissent stays true to the strange application of the four
fair use factors out of their statutory order and continues next to the
market effects prong. Justice Thomas cites Harper & Row and touts
this factor as the “single most important element of fair use.”71 This
is evidenced by the order in which the dissent chose to analyze these
factors, and this is by far the most convincing of the dissent’s points.
First, the dissent says, Google’s mobile platform essentially
usurped Oracle’s hold on the market. Manufacturers, as a result,
were no longer willing to pay to install the Java platform. Oracle’s
deal with Amazon, specifically, is cited as having been negotiated
down by 97.5%.72 Samsung’s contract went from a mighty $40
million to around $1 million.73 Direct evidence of decrease in the
plaintiff’s market value due to the copying at issue is rare in
copyright fair use cases. Here, the dissent argues, is direct evidence

70

Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122.
Google No. 18-956. at 1216.
72
Id.
73
Id.
71
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of “enormous harm” to Oracle’s licensing scheme that the majority
does not deny but fails to mention.74
Furthermore, this affected any opportunity that Oracle may
have had to license their platform to developers of mobile systems.75
The dissent says that the majority’s argument that Oracle was
unable to enter into the mobile device market is insufficient because
under the market effect prong, the court looks to (1) the potential
market that the creators of original works could develop in general,
and (2) any potential markets that the copyright owner could license
for development by others. 76 Notice how this case started due to a
failed licensing agreement between Oracle and Google? If the two
had struck a successful licensing agreement, then Oracle may have
been able to salvage its licensing fees which were ultimately
reduced substantially as a result of Google’s new mobile platform.
Ultimately, it seems that both parties, by failing to come to terms,
faced a loss. Google, now having to expend significant time and
costs for ten years in the court system; and Oracle, now losing out
on a vast amount of licensing fees due to the creation of Google’s
new platform, which ultimately supplanted its own.
Next, the dissent addresses the majority’s concern that
ruling against fair use in such a case would allow an essential
monopoly by Oracle that would limit the creativity and future
development of programs. The dissent says that the very history of
this case contradicts this point because “this case concerns only
versions of Android released through November 14 . . . Google has
released six major versions since then. Only about 7.7% of active
Android devices still run on the versions at issue.”77 A key example
of one of the central issues in this case, the programs that the Court
is debating, and the industry standard being questioned, have all
already gotten away.

74

Id.
Id. At 1217. (citing Campbell)
76
Google No. 18-956, slip op. at 1217.
77
Id.
75
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Addressed finally in this section is the fact that other market
substitutes were created without copying by both Apple and
Microsoft.78 However, the merger doctrine still does apply when
there are very limited ways of expressing a certain idea that is
inherently bound to its expression.79 Is it likely that Apple and
Microsoft just developed those other very limited options of
expression? Still, the fact that Apple and Microsoft were able to
create their own mobile operating systems begs the question of
whether Google’s copying was necessary at all and brings into
perspective that element of bad faith again. Lastly, Justice Thomas
is rightfully concerned that allowing such use would disincentivize
creation by authors since the exclusive rights to their works would
receive less protection under this regime. Overall, the dissent clearly
finds that this factor falls against the application of fair use in direct
contrast to the majority’s opinion.
e. Purpose & Character of the Use
The dissent argues that the copying for the purposes of
enabling the creation of new products on a mobile platform is not
within the meaning of “transformative.” It is argued that such an
interpretation of transformative would “eviscerate” copyright
because any new products created from a copyrighted product
would be protected as a transformative use.80 This is not within the
meaning of “something that is fundamentally different from the
original.”81 In conclusion, the use is not transformative but was
instead an exploitation of the copyrighted material “without paying
the customary price.”82 Justice Thomas’s viewpoint on the
majority’s interpretation of transformative use is important because
it brings into question to what extent a use must be transformative.
In the traditional sense, Google’s development of the mobile
78

Id.
Merger Doctrine refers to when an idea is inextricably bound with its
expression so that there are very limited ways of expressing the idea, therefore
copyright protection cannot extend to it. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 705.
80
Google No. 18-956, slip op at 1219.
81
Id.
82
Id. citing Harper & Row.
79
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platform does not bring new meaning or message to the java
platform, but enables mobile devices to now be able to use the
platform. One could argue that this is transformative enough, and
this is an argument that the majority agrees with, however, Justice
Thomas is rightfully concerned about the possible policy
implications. If one could create a new use from the same product,
and that new use essentially supplants the market for the original
product, should it really be deemed as transformative? If this were
to be the case, then any “new” creation of a product of the original
creator could be effectively undermined and destroy the incentives
that copyright protection was intended to extend to creators.
f. Amount & Substantiality of The
Portion Taken
Finally, the dissent argues that the copying at issue was at
the heart of the program, and that more was taken than necessary in
order for the copier to create a transformative use.83 Therefore,
factor also cuts against fair use.
C. Alternatives To The Copyright Scheme for Technological
Innovation
Compulsive licensing, private agencies, and government
oversight, have all been implemented into the copyright scheme for
music law. Therefore, it is not a novel idea to try to implement any,
or all, of these systems into the copyright regime for technology.
However, music law, due to a lengthy history of broadcasting
lobbies and other factors, is extremely complicated as a result.
Although these schemes attempt to find an effective compromise
between the interests of several different groups of people, many of
whom play critical roles in the making of the music, some of these
ideas are still relatively new, and may have just further complicated
matters as a result. So where does this leave technological
innovations in the scheme of copyright law?

83

Id.
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Independent Government Agencies

First, it is unlikely that an independent, bureaucratic agency
where an owner would negotiate to sell their rights for
compensation, would actually be a workable solution for a few
reasons.84 For one, there may be constitutional challenges in
concern to this regime because the Copyright and Patent Clause is
specifically designed to benefit authors, and the selling of rights for
possibly only a one-time fee, could be seen as removing essential
exclusive rights, monopoly privileges, and moral rights of authors.85
Furthermore, it may actually end up disincentivizing creation in
direct opposition to the goal of the Copyright and Patent Clause.
ii.

Private Agencies

Private agencies may be a more workable standard,
however, like the application in music law, one could sell some of
the exclusive rights, like that of distribution and reproduction, for a
fee to the private agency, which in turn licenses out that exclusive
right for use to other companies and takes a share of the licensing
fees, while the remainder goes to the copyright owner. Based on the
consensus among technology companies, this would appear to be a
more workable compromise. First companies could still negotiate
with other private licensing companies for terms that are favorable
to them. Furthermore, since this would be a private industry scheme,
there could be several companies all competing for licensing deals,
much like record labels, in turn offering more options for
technology companies. Secondly, everyone would still retain some
set of exclusive rights, even the original copyright owner, and still
continue to be paid for that work. The incentive thus remains intact
for authors to continue to create works. Lastly, the ability to pay a
reasonable licensing fee as a result of several companies competing
for deals on both the supplier and consumer end, would allow the
continuation of technological progress based off of new ideas
84

Lior Zeimer, Rethinking Copyright Alternatives, 14 INT'l J.L. & INFO.
TECH. 137 (2006).
85
Art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
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supplied to the marketplace while also maintaining adequate
compensation for the creators and copyright owners. This is the type
of solution which would allow for a benefit to all involved. The
overall regime would be complex, but it could be argued that it has
(1) been done before in the context of music law, and (2) it would
be worth it in order to effectuate the incentives, pay, and progress
desired.
iii.
FRAND
FRAND licensing of patents seems to offer a welcome
compromise to these regimes that seem overbearing or
unsatisfactory. Under FRAND licenses, entities that have a product
or process that have interoperable features can submit its patents to
a standard setting organization (“SSO”) within its industry which
then decides whether or not that patent is a standard-essential patent
(“SEP”).86 This patent must meet certain requirements and the
owner relinquishes certain rights and must agree to certain
commitments. There are many benefits to this system. For one,
companies are incentivized to submit their patents to become an
industry standard because it eliminates lengthy negotiation
processes over licenses with many different companies, competition
among these companies, and increases marketing power.87 The
companies do have the ability to receive a reasonable royalty fee for
this license, or to license it for free.88 Furthermore, it creates a
standard industry platform therefore all companies can be up-todate with the latest processes and products. It also eliminates
discrepancies because the licenses should be essentially the same or
similar to all licensees according to FRAND’s terms and the
oversight of the SSO. Finally, there are also viable remedies for
when these terms are broken or abused. FRAND licenses operate as
contracts and therefore failure to comply with its terms can provide
for injunctive and breach of contract claims.89 However, this does
prevent issues due to the variety of possible remedies and
86
Srividhya Ragavan et al., Frand v. Compulsory Licensing: The Lesser of the
Two Evils, 14 Duke Law & Technology Review 84, 87 (2015).
87
Id. at 89.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 93.
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inconsistent outcomes of such cases. It has also been difficult to
reconcile internationally, which ultimately impedes on the market
efficiencies that this scheme was supposed to create, especially in a
world where society and economy are more globalized, this issue
could continue to grow in the future.90 Overall, patent law has
demonstrated that this standard is workable, and possibly more
appealing to private businesses who want as little government
oversight as possible and want to continue to receive reasonable
royalty fees. However, it may impede future economic growth on
an international scale, and whether having multiple SSOs for
oversight for different industries may be beneficial because each is
tailored to that specific industry, it may prove to be a complex
system that is difficult, and inefficient to navigate.
iv.

Compulsive Licensing

Under a compulsory licensing scheme, one could still
maintain the option to negotiate a license with the copyright owner.
However, should that fail, they could still use the product through
notification to the Copyright Office, and pay a set fee.91 Again, this
is already in effect in music law. Should someone who desires to
use a copyrighted sound recording and the licensing deal from the
source fails, there is a separate government agency that analyzes a
set of several factors and sets a baseline licensing fee that must be
paid for compulsory license. So long as the copyright office is
notified of such use and the license is paid, the license goes into
effect. However, as mentioned before, companies are concerned
over having control over their intellectual property. To some extent,
compulsory licenses remove this control. Secondly, it is argued that
compulsory licenses do not offer fair compensation for the license.
It essentially removes the company’s ability to negotiate favorable
terms, and it is argued that the burden is felt disproportionately on
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the licensor.92 Third, owners and creators argue that compulsory
licenses disincentives for creation. Compulsory licenses are
ultimately a difficult balancing act. While compulsory licenses may
enable licensees to create new products or services from the
available technology, it may decrease the overall contribution from
these original creators who provided that building block in the first
place.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the case of Google v. Oracle demonstrates the
many issues with the current copyright scheme and its applicability
to modern technological advancements. There are no modern
solutions to these licensing and use problems that would prove an
adequate compromise, and the court cases that continue to shoehorn
past historical precedent into modern issues that directly challenge
and straddle the lines of all of the applicable rules. Although the
decision in Google v. Oracle was not a split decision, when
comparing the opinions of the dissent and majority, both can seem
equally persuasive in light of the facts as each side presents and
applies them to the rules. It is clear from this case that alternative,
workable solutions are necessary.
In light of the alternatives presented above, there are several
possible workable standards. For one, a combination of the private
agency and compulsive licensing schemes currently work together
in music law, providing for a viable compromise between licensors
and licensees. Although the compulsory licensing scheme is
relatively new, it provides a new avenue and compromise for the
many players within the music arena. Like in music law, there are
several individuals with interests in concern to the copyright
ownership, creation, distribution, and reproduction of these rights.
FRAND also offers a clear alternative that presents both incentives
and benefits for both sides. Overall, however, a clear scheme will
be necessary in the future in order to enable tech companies to
operate without constant fear or worry of impending litigation. This
92
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would enable further growth and development which is the overall
goal, while ensuring that everyone receives the compensation that
they are owed and have earned. The tech world and its many facets
have outgrown the old copyright scheme, and it is necessary that the
courts and the legislature rethink attempting to fit it into a regime
that it no longer fits in.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol32/iss1/4

30

